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Abstract—The stringent requirement of the demand-supply
equilibrium for delivering electricity has traditionally been dealt
with a supply-side perspective, assuming that the demand is
not alterable. With the promises of the Smart Grid, demand-
side management techniques are increasingly becoming more
feasible. A demand-side management technique, called Demand
Response, aims at inducing changes in electricity load in response
to financial incentives, some of which involve bidding as the
underlying facilitator. It is well-established that the effectiveness
of the DR is proportional to the number of participants. Yet,
many of the DR programs, including those involving bidding, may
suffer due to consumer privacy concerns. Within this context,
in this paper, we propose a distributed and multi-unit privacy
guaranteeing bidding mechanism as part of a DR program
without relying on any third party, trusted or not, to protect
the participants’ bidding information, except obviously for the
winning price and the winner exposed to the utility. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first such approach for the DR bidding
programs. We provide a security analysis of our approach under
the honest-but-curious and active adversary assumptions and
prove the privacy assuring property.
Index Terms—Smart Grid Privacy, Demand Response, De-
mand Response Bidding Privacy, Bidding Privacy without
Trusted Third Party.
I. INTRODUCTION
A major paradigm shift in the generation, transmission, and
distribution of electricity has been gaining more momentum
than ever under the umbrella term of Smart Grid (SG) [1]–
[3]. Electricity service has a distinctive characteristic that
requires the maintenance of the supply and demand equilib-
rium at all times. The loss of this equilibrium may result
in regulatory intervention, cost increases, and/or frequency
instabilities. With the infeasibility of its storage, the generated
power must be consumed rapidly to avoid any complications
in the infrastructure. The conventional mechanism to cope
with this intrinsically required equilibrium has been through
adjusting the supply side since demand has been assumed
to be non-manipulatable. Demand-side techniques have been
gaining more attention with advances in the computing and
communications technologies [4], [5]. These approaches, gen-
erally referred to as Demand Response (DR) programs, are at
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the same time a key facilitator of the SG to induce change/shift
in electricity consumption to restore the demand-supply equi-
librium under perilous conditions or during imbalance periods.
Wild fluctuations of the real demand for power are either
suppressed or distended to achieve a smoother and more
desirable effective demand, which in turn has dramatic effects
on the price of the electricity produced. The aggregate values
of effective and real demand may be identical, if only demand
shifting mechanisms are utilized, or different, if demand
suppression mechanisms are employed. Thus, DR may reduce
new capital expenditures in generation, transmission, and
distribution [6]. See [7], [8] for more detailed discussion of
financial and performance benefits.
DR programs include incentives, tariffs, and programs
(among other mechanisms). Many DR programs include some
form or shape of bidding in their implementations. For exam-
ple, some expose Real Time Pricing (RTP) [7], [9] to end
users and some are based on customers bidding for energy
usage, such as demand bidding [8], [10] where customers bid
for incentives to alter load. Upcoming emissions trading [11],
ancillary services market program [8], distribution automation
load management, electric vehicle charging/discharging, retail
power electricity market [11], [12] are all expected to include
some bidding mechanism.
A very basic sine qua non of any DR is the generation,
transmission, storage, maintenance, and analysis of unprece-
dented amount of data through smart meters in the Advanced
Metering Infrastructure (AMI). An inevitable consequence of
such abundance of data is the ease of extraction of Personally
Identifiable Information (PII) for potential abuse or misuse,
such as behavioral inferences, deduction of individual habits
or activities [11], [13]–[17]. Bidding as part of DR programs
in the SG is thus subject to privacy concerns.
In this paper, we propose a novel system to provide a
distributed, privacy-guaranteeing bidding protocol involving
only a service provider and bidding customers without the
need for the involvement of any other entities such as a trusted
third party. At the end of our proposed bidding process, only
the winning bidder is disclosed to the service provider while
neither the bidders nor the service provider can learn the
other customers’ private bidding prices to infer any private
information. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first
privacy-preserving protocol proposed in the SG energy bidding
process where no third party entity is involved to minimize the
exposure of the private information.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II sum-
marizes the related work. A synopsis of our proposed approach
in terms of the linear expressions is provided in Section III
2with an illustrative toy example. Section IV provides the full
cryptographic details built on Elgamal encryption. A secu-
rity analysis with Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) describe
the privacy assuring features of our approach in Section V.
Section VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
The awareness and sensitivity of the public have been in-
creasing on privacy issues due partly to such recent news as the
European Court of Justice’s invalidation of Safe Harbor Law,
Wikileaks, US NSA leaks by Edward Snowden, Facebook’s
recent disclosure of Emotion Experiment, and EU’s recent
ruling on “right to be forgotten.” It is within the same line
of interest that privacy dimension of the DR initiatives needs
to be addressed.
A succinct definition of privacy may stated as the “the right
to be left alone” [18]. In more general terms, our work falls
into the domain of privacy-enhancing technologies (PET) as
coined by Chaum in 1995 [19] and defined in [20]:
PET stands for a coherent system of Information
and communications technology (ICT) measures that
protects privacy by eliminating or reducing personal
data or by preventing unnecessary and/or undesired
processing of personal data, all without losing the
functionality of the information system.
The main focus of SG related privacy studies has been
placed on the smart meter data collection for monitoring and
billing [21] in terms of perturbing, anonymizing, minimiz-
ing, and/or obfuscating the transmission. Privacy of behavior,
action, lifestyle, presence/absence, and number of persons
may be derived from the smart meter data. The inviolability
of family life and homes is in danger. A report by Dutch
Consumers’ Association concluded that smart meters would
violate article 8 of the the European Convention of Human
Rights [17]. In the DR context, Customer Energy Usage Data
(CEUD) as well as any other personally identifiable data
from collection, transmission, aggregation, dissemination, and
analysis should also be included as part of the privacy studies.
Similar to potential inferences that can be drawn from CEUD,
bidding information may reveal consumer’s behavior, which
may be personally objectionable or outright unlawful in some
countries [17]. Yet, DR privacy, and bidding in particular, can-
not make use of the existing privacy techniques [21] directly
as accuracy is crucially essential for acceptable operation and
has not received much attention.
OpenADR (Automated Demand Response) [22], [23] is an
open standard communications specification to relay DR sig-
nals back and forth among the participating entities. OpenADR
version 1 specifies a Demand Response Automation Server
(DRAS) as entity that manages notification, participation as
well as final rewarding of customers whenever DR-incentive is
requested by the utility provider. With that provision, Paverd
et al. suggest in [24], [25] a form of a trusted third party
relaying entity, called Trusted Remote Entity (TRE), that is
mainly responsible for anonymization of customers in DR-
bidding to prevent utility provider having direct access to
customer private bidding information. TRE is also responsible
for billing of customers and consumption data in real time. In
fact, privacy is established in the presence of mutual distrust
between the utility and customers by means of a trusted
platform module (TPM).
Karwe et al. [26] similarly focus on interactive DR-
demands, stating that a semi-honest DRAS may easily com-
promise the privacy of customers. They propose enhanced
functionality for DRAS, the trusted third party, to hide con-
sumption profiles of customers. DRAS is responsible for
pseudonymization of real identities to protect customer privacy
from utility provider, whereas utility and customers use at-
tribute based encryption (ABE) to hinder DRAS from looking
into private data.
Gong et al. [27] propose a solution in which identity of
customers are linked with pseudonyms at the proxy and incen-
tive based DR is implemented on these anonymous accounts.
They incorporate identity-committable signatures, ZKPs and
partially blind signatures to prevent malicious activity with
these anonymous parties. However, they also rely on a trusted
third party, called demand response provider, who is capable
of tracking the bidding history of any participant for future
potential privacy violations. In our scheme, bidding history of
the participants cannot be tracked and no profiling may take
place by any third-party, except obviously for the winner that
must be known to the utility.
Similarly, Rahman et al. [28] propose a privacy solution
for incentive based DR. While the authors claim to establish
a bidding process without a trusted third party, the Bidding
Manager (BM) in their setup acts as an identity escrow
agency, implying a level of trust and hence a notion of trusted
third party in the scheme. Further, any coalition between
BM and Relaying Manager (RM) leaves the customer privacy
exposed. That is, BM and RM are capable of keeping track of
bidding history of the participants for future potential privacy
violations. Finally, it is unclear whether their bidding scenario
works for single-winner or multi-winner and how winners are
chosen in a verifiable manner.
In the aforementioned studies, the deployment of an inter-
mediary or a trusted third party1, be it TRE, proxy, BM or
DRAS, proliferates the entities involved and potential attack
vectors, and increases the uneasiness of, at the very least,
the privacy-conscious customers, if not a larger population
(i.e., the possibility of existence of a weak chain in privacy
protection system deters some customers from taking place in
bidding processes). Please note that there is nothing required
in our scheme to eliminate intermediaries. A hierarchical
system would just be fine with these intermediaries to continue
providing their useful function. We are just hiding irrelevant
information from the utility or utility-like entities (such as
1It is a generally known fact that companies are after consumer data to
be able to market more products and bombard them with more other adver-
tisements. The consumers are profiled from these extracted data. The tracked
information includes habits, patterns, behavior, location, demographics, etc.
Bidding history is a useful piece of information to these profiling activities.
This is what we are shielding from the utility company in the bidding process,
of course except for the winner. Thus, it is perfectly fine with our scheme
to have intermediaries (or aggregators) to act like a utility in a hierarchical
bidding system. What we are providing is the privacy protection to the
customers against these intermediaries without eliminating them.
3intermediaries) from accessing, and hence collecting, more
information than necessary in line with the generally accepted
security best practices of the principle of the least privileged.
To the best of our knowledge, the only other privacy-
guaranteeing DR bidding scheme proposed in the literature
that truly does not rely on a third party in any shape or form
is reported in our earlier work [29], which has a high computa-
tional complexity in a single-winner based auction system. In
this paper, we present our novel privacy-assured bidding (PAB)
solution for the SG DR by augmenting our aforementioned
solution with a multi-unit, multi-winner auction algorithm for
both the customers and the utility company. As part of the
security analysis, we provide Zero-Knowledge Proofs to show
that our algorithms can guarantee the privacy under different
threat models.
Such an approach without a trusted third party is likely
to be a key argument in the post-Snowden era in allaying
customers’ fears about privacy violations and/or in recruiting
more customers into DR programs, which is critical in long-
term success and sustainability of such initiatives.
III. BASIC ALGORITHM FOR PRIVACY ASSURED BIDDING
Our auction can be classified as a multi-unit, multi-winner,
and single-price auction. That is, in our scheme, the utility
starts the bidding process by announcing the relevant parame-
ters, namely the price vector and the total number of units
being auctioned. Interested customers enter into the biding
by specifying the units demanded and the bidding price. It
is always possible for customers to stay out of the bidding
process and to take advantage of the standard tariff. At the end
of the bidding, winners and losers2 together with the winning
price is decided. Winners get the exact quantity they originally
sought at the price they specified or lower.
In this section, we describe fundamental linear operations
of our approach without emphasizing the cryptographic di-
mension in order to simplify the notation and the narrative.
The motivation is to build a linear system, that fits the auction
description above, in which participants can submit their bids,
distribute the available number of units from highest to lowest
bid offer, and determine their individual outcomes through
a given linear function. By restricting our system to linear
operations, we will be able to make use of the homomorphic
properties of Elgamal encryption, as described in Section IV.
A. Mathematical Formulation
The notation table for our approach is given in Table I.
We use indices i or a to imply that an element is related to
customer i or a, respectively, and similarly j to imply that
particular element corresponds to the j-th price.
2DR-bidding mechanism envisions shifting the peak consumption to relaxed
hours. The energy auctioned is not the total energy delivered by the utility
companies. The bidding is a method in the overall demand response mech-
anism where we would like to have some demand-side attempts to maintain
the load-supply equilibrium, especially during periods of higher-than-normal
risk. As such, that is not the main means of delivering energy, nor it is the sole
methodology. Thus, losing an auction is just missing the opportunity to take
advantage of the incentives or financial compensation offered in exchange for
a change or shift in demand; it does not mean the loser will be left without
energy.
TABLE I
NOTATIONS USED IN OUR APPROACH.
n Number of customers participating in bidding
k Number of acceptable price values in bidding
i Generic index ranging from 1 to n
j Generic index ranging from 1 to k
a Secondary index ranging from 1 to n
pi The descending price vector with k discrete values
M Pre-announced available number of units
V Maximum number of units each customer can demand
ba The bid vector for customer a
B The matrix to represent all bid vectors together
d Cumulative demand vector
c Winning price indicator created by the utility
bida The index of bidding price submitted by customer a
unita The number of units demanded by customer a
xa The private key of customer a
ya The public key of customer a
y The master public key jointly generated by all customers
We base the principal protocol design of our approach on
the idea described in [30], [31]. M is the total number of units
being sold, e.g. the amount of energy units, V corresponds
to the maximum number of units each customer can demand,
e.g. 50KWh, and n is the number of customers participating,
i.e. electric consumers. Also, pi is a price vector of discrete
values sorted in descending order, e.g. [60, 50, 40, 30], defined
by the utility, and k is the size of pi , i.e. k = |pi |:
pi = [pi1 pi2 pi3 · · · pik]
Let L`, U`, I` denote the `× ` lower triangular, upper
triangular and identity matrices, respectively. Furthermore, let
R∗` denote an `× ` “randomization matrix”,
R∗` =

∗ 0 · · · 0
0 ∗ . . . ...
...
. . . . . . 0
0 · · · 0 ∗

whose diagonal entries ∗ are jointly-generated random num-
bers unknown to any single customer. This random matrix is
used upon the termination of the protocol to guarantee that no
private information is leaked, as explained later.
Whenever a new DR bidding is initiated by the utility,
along with the announcement of the parameters (pi ,M,V ), each
customer i chooses an element with index bidi from the price
vector pi and the number of units uniti to buy at pi bidi price,
such that 1≤ uniti ≤V and 1≤ bidi ≤ k. Then, each customer
creates a bid vector denoted by bi such that |bi| = k = |pi |,
which consists of (k−1) 0s, and uniti at index bidi, as given
below:
bi =
[
0 · · · 0 uniti 0 · · · 0
]T
which states that the customer is bidding to purchase uniti
many units of energy at up to a price of pi bidi . In order
to simplify the notation, we define B as a matrix whose
columns correspond to the bid vectors of customers, i.e.
B = [b1|b2| · · · |bn]. Now that any customer i has his own
4bid vector placed in i-th column of matrix B, the cumulative
demand vector is defined as d:
d =
n
∑
i=1
bi (1)
The first goal of the utility is to find the maximum index t
that satisfies the inequalities for the pre-announced available
amount M:
t
∑
j=1
d j ≤M <
t+1
∑
j=1
d j (2)
After finding t, the utility creates a vector, denoted by c,
that consists of (k−1) 1s, and one 0 at the t-th entry only.
c =
[
1 · · · 1 0 1 · · · 1]T (3)
The final outcome function for each customer i is given
below, with which each customer can infer whether he won,
and if so, at what price. It is important to randomize non-zero
elements of the outcome function so that a customer can only
infer his win/loss status.
fi(B) = R∗k (c+(Uk− Ik) bi) (4)
By marking the indices except t with ones in c, we are masking
the other bid values, so that any winner concludes this price as
the final. Finally, each customer i checks the result of fi(B) to
find whether there is a 0 in it or not. The latter simply means
the customer lost the bidding, whereas the former indicates
that he won and can determine the price by using the position
of 0 in fi(B) that corresponds to the actual price in pi . Note that
in this multi-unit multi-winner auction system, the available
units are distributed among the bidders who offered one of
the highest t prices in the price vector pi . This implies that
there might be some unsold units from available pool at the
end.
Our focus in this paper is in the privacy-protection of the
bidding process. There are various different auction method-
ologies in the literature (e.g., English Auction, Dutch Auction,
Vickery Auction). Our goal is not to optimize the bidding
process nor to pick one of the aforementioned auction mech-
anisms. The distribution of units algorithm in our protocol
is such that the available number of units are distributed
among the highest t price bidders depending on the available
units M. We thereby assume a simple and fair auctioning
mechanism as the underlying bidding in order to provide a
cryptographically secure and private protocol. We do not claim
any optimality in that sense, but we assure that bidder privacy
is protected. Nevertheless, our protocol can be modified fairly
easily to accommodate a wide range of bidding protocols in
the removal of dependency on trusted third parties to achieve
privacy preservation.
B. Toy Example
As an example, below are the three bid vectors for three
customers; for the price vector pi = [60 50 40 30], where M is
defined as 6 units. From n= 3 customers in total, customer 1
wants to buy 3 units at a price of up to $60, customer 2 wants
to buy 2 units at a price of up to $50, and customer 3 wants
4 units up to $40. They create their bi vectors as follows:
b1 =

3
0
0
0
 , b2 =

0
2
0
0
 , b3 =

0
0
4
0

Then, customers should jointly calculate d:
d =
n
∑
i=1
bi =

3
2
4
0

Now the utility finds t = 2 as stated in Equation (2) and
creates the c vector.
c =
[
1 0 1 1
]T
From this we can easily compute the outcome function fi
for each customer as shown below:
f1(B) = R∗k1


1
0
1
1
+

0 1 1 1
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0


3
0
0
0

=

∗
0
∗
∗

f2(B) = R∗k2


1
0
1
1
+

0 1 1 1
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0


0
2
0
0

=

∗
0
∗
∗

f3(B) = R∗k3


1
0
1
1
+

0 1 1 1
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0


0
0
4
0

=

∗
∗
∗
∗

Note that each * denotes a uniform non-zero random value
independent of others, and is used to mask non-zero values
so a customer cannot infer anything about his rivals. At the
end, customer 1 and customer 2 concludes that they won
the bidding with the price of $50 with the quantities they
submitted. Customer 3 only realizes that he lost.
The operations mentioned so far actually consist of three
phases:
i. Customers jointly calculate d from the bi vectors.
ii. The utility determines t from d, and creates c.
iii. Customers calculate their outcome fi(B) by using c.
Note that the first and third operations are linear and
may be performed in the exponent as part of the Elgamal
encryption to be described in the next section by exploiting
the homomorphic property. They are performed as separate
rounds in the multiparty computation to be detailed below.
However, the second operation requires a full knowledge and
disclosure of the complete vector d. Thus, we assume that the
utility will have an access to that information in order to carry
out that phase of the operations.
Please note that the matrix representations we used so far are
chosen to simplify the formal description and imply linearity
5of operations in our protocol, but the real implementation of
the protocol replaces the matrix operations with the crypto-
graphic operations described in the following section.
IV. PRIVACY ASSURED BIDDING PROTOCOL
In this section, we enhance the algorithm presented in the
previous section with cryptographic operations using Elgamal
encryption, thereby define our protocol.
A. Preliminaries
Elgamal encryption is one of the best-known public key
cryptosystems after RSA. It has a simple and elegant mathe-
matical structure that allows such operations as distributed key
generation and homomorphic encryption. In a prelude to the
explanation of our approach, we below summarize the Elgamal
encryption algorithm and its various relevant features. All the
arithmetic is carried out in Zp unless otherwise stated.
Elgamal Cryptosystem: Let p be a large prime, and g be
an element of order q in Z∗p, for some large prime q |(p−1).
Alice chooses a random x∈ {1,2, . . . ,q−1} as her private key,
and y= gx mod p is her public key. To encrypt a message µ for
Alice, Bob chooses a random r∈{1,2, . . . ,q−1} as a one-time
secret, and computes the ciphertext (α,β ) as α = µyr mod p
and β = gr mod p (i.e., the message is masked by gxr mod p).
Alice decrypts the message by recomputing the masking factor
by gxr = β x and removing it from the message: µ = α(β x)−1.
Homomorphic Encryption: Elgamal encryption is homo-
morphic according to multiplication: Given E(µ1) = (α1,β1)
and E(µ2) = (α2,β2), we can compute the encryption of µ1µ2
by E(µ1µ2) = (α1α2, β1β2).
Distributed Key Generation: A common Elgamal pub-
lic/private key pair can be generated by a group of participants
by each participant generating a part of the key: Each party i
generates his partial private and public key (xi,yi = gxi) and
broadcasts the public key yi to the group. The master public
key is y=∏i yi. The private key x = ∑i xi mod q is held in a
distributed fashion by the group where party i has share xi.
Distributed Decryption: Let (α,β ) be a ciphertext en-
crypted under a public key y = gx, where the private key
x = ∑i xi mod q is distributed among a group of participants
with user i having xi. The message can be decrypted col-
lectively, without any participant revealing his secret share:
User i computes and broadcasts φi = β xi . One participant
combines these partial results and decrypts the message as
µ = α(∏i φi)−1.
Distributed Randomization: The homomorphic property
of Elgamal encryption enables a group of users to random-
ize an encrypted message while the randomization factor is
unknown to any user: For a given ciphertext (α,β ), each
party picks his randomization parameter mi, calculates and
broadcasts (αi = αmi ,βi = βmi). The randomized ciphertext is
calculated as (αm =∏iαi,βm =∏iβi), for m= ∑imi.
B. Bidding Privacy Using Multiparty Computation
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) is used to compute
a function collectively by a number of participants such that,
in the end, no participant can learn anything except its own
input and the result [32]. In this section, we give an MPC
protocol that calculates the outcome of the auction described
in Section III privately.
We first give a high-level description of our protocol and
then the details:
1) Each customer a generates a public-private key pair
(xa,ya) and broadcasts the ya value.
2) The common group public key y=∏ni=1 yi mod p is cal-
culated by all, and the group private key x=∑ni=1 xi mod
q is composed of partial private keys held by the cus-
tomers, none of which may construct the full group
private key.
3) Each customer a generates his bid vector ba, encrypts it
by the group public key, and broadcasts.
4) Each customer calculates a partial decryption factor using
his share of the private key, and sends it to the utility.
5) The utility decrypts the cumulative demand vector d using
the partial results computed by the customers. Then the
utility calculates the c vector, encrypts it by the group
public key, and broadcasts.
6) Each customer calculates his auction function in Equa-
tion (4) in the exponent and broadcasts the result.
7) Each customer calculates a set of partial decryption
factors over the values broadcast in the previous step,
and sends them to the utility.
8) The utility shares these partial results selectively such that
each customer can calculate the auction result privately,
without learning anything extra.
We now describe the protocol in detail. The calculations are
in Z∗p:
Round 1: Customer a generates a private key xa, its public
key ya = gxa , a random vector ra, and a matrix of random
values m(a)i j ,1≤ i≤ n,1≤ j≤ k. Then, he broadcasts his partial
public key ya and calculates the common public key y, by
using the partial public keys of the others:
y=
n
∏
i=1
yi
Round 2: Customer a encrypts his bid vector ba,
αa j = gba j · yra j βa j = gra j
for 1≤ j ≤ k, and broadcasts it.
Round 3: Each customer calculates, for 1≤ j ≤ k,
α ′j =
n
∏
i=1
αi j , β ′j =
n
∏
i=1
βi j .
Round 4: Customer a calculates and sends his partial
decryption factor φ ′a j, for 1 ≤ j ≤ k, to the utility privately
(over Transport Layer Security –TLS–) so that the utility can
decrypt d:
φ ′a j = β
′ xa
j
Round 5: The utility computes, for 1≤ j ≤ k,
gd j =
α ′j
∏ni=1 φ ′i j
.
6In order to obtain d, the utility needs to extract each d j by
solving a discrete logarithm with an upper bound of nV . This
problem can be solved practically by “square-root” methods
such as Shank’s baby-step-giant-step [33] and Pollard’s kan-
garoo [34]. For cases where k nV , the algorithm described
in [35] can be preferred.
After calculating d, the utility determines the index t and
creates the c vector as described in Equations (2) and (3).
Round 6: The utility encrypts c using random ru j to
calculate αu j, for 1≤ j ≤ k, where u denotes the utility:
αu j = gc j · yru j βu j = gru j
Round 7: Customer a executes the linear operation given
in Equation (4) in the exponent, randomized by m(a)i j ,
γ(a)i j =
(
αu j ·
k
∏
q= j+1
αiq
)m(a)i j
σ (a)i j =
(
βu j ·
k
∏
q= j+1
βiq
)m(a)i j
for 1≤ i≤ n,1≤ j ≤ k, and broadcasts the result.
Round 8: Customer a calculates and sends his decryption
factors φ (a)i j , for 1 ≤ i ≤ n,1 ≤ j ≤ k, to the utility privately
(over TLS):
φ (a)i j =
n
∏
q=1
(
σ (q)i j
)xa
The utility broadcasts all φ (a)i j parameters for 1≤ i≤ n,1≤ j≤
k,1≤ a≤ n, except a= i. By doing so, the utility guarantees
that only the customer a himself can compute the function
fa(B).
Round 9: Finally, customer a does the following
component-wise computation as the final operation to compute
his individual fa(B) to check his win/loss status:
g fa(B) j =
∏ni=1 γ
(i)
a j
∏ni=1 φ
(i)
a j
At this point, customer a checks the final result in the
exponent to see whether the vector g fa(B) contains a 1, which
corresponds to having a 0 in fa(B). If there is a 1 in the result,
the position of 1 is used to determine the unit price from the pi
price vector. Note that, the utility also computes fa(B) function
for each customer a to determine the winners.
In the end, the only extra information available to the utility
is the cumulative demand vector d, which corresponds to total
demand versus price information pertaining to current bidding
process. Note that this vector does not contain any private
information about any customer. As such, making the total
demand vector d transparent does not compromise any privacy
notion with respect to the customers. Further, it may facilitate
a useful mechanism for the customers for their future bids as
a historical data point. Utility’s access to this information is
also beneficial in the sense that it will know what the current
market conditions are.
The most performance demanding aspect of our algorithm
comes from the Round 7, in which randomization of elements
are performed. This requires computations with matrices that
have n2k elements. Thus our algorithm scales with O(n2k).
We believe our algorithm can be easily implemented for
bidding in low-cost embedded devices. Please also note that
the bidding algorithm we hereby propose is not expected to
run in a real-time scenario. The time-granularity is likely to
be in a similar magnitude of real-time pricing updates from
the utility, which is typically in 15 minutes or so. When the
time scale is considered within these parameters, our algorithm
is significantly well within the expected frequency of such
mechanisms and in an acceptable time frame.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In the previous section, we have defined our basic protocol
which is secure against honest but curious (HbC) adversaries,
i.e., a party who acts honestly and performs the prescribed
operation exactly, but may go beyond what is expected of
him and tries to extract privacy-violating information by acting
curiously. In this section, we enhance our protocol to be secure
against fully malicious adversaries [36] who do not necessarily
follow the protocol or create their inputs as specified. Later,
we also discuss a hybrid version which is more efficient than
the fully secure version.
We employ zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) to verify that
expected operations are honestly performed. ZKPs enable us to
verify the integrity of the protocol through validation without
forcing parties to disclose their private information. In what
follows, we first elaborate on four ZKPs. Building on top of
these four ZKPs, we go on to provide the security analysis
to prove that privacy of customer bids are guaranteed in our
approach.
A. Zero-Knowledge Proofs
In what follows, we drop modp from the notations to reduce
the clutter. As before, all the arithmetic is in mod p (in Z∗p)
unless otherwise stated.
ZK1: Alice has y= gx and wants to prove her knowledge
of x to Bob, without disclosing x, where y and g are
publicly known [37].
i. Alice picks a random z, sends gz to Bob.
ii. Bob sends a random c as a challenge to Alice.
iii. Alice sends r = (z+ xc) mod q to Bob.
iv. Bob checks if gr = gzyc.
ZK2: Alice has y1 = gx1 and y2 = g
x
2 and wants to
prove equality and knowledge of discrete logarithm
logg1 y1 = logg2 y2 = x, without disclosing x, where
y1, y2, g1 and g2 are public [38].
i. Alice picks z randomly and sends gz1, g
z
2 to Bob.
ii. Bob sends a random c as challenge to Alice.
iii. Alice sends r = (z+ xc) mod q to Bob.
iv. Bob verifies the equality of two discrete logarithm
by checking both gr1 = g
z
1y
c
1 and g
r
2 = g
z
2y
c
2.
ZK3: Alice has (α,β ) = (myr,gr) and wants to prove that
either m= z or m= 1 without disclosing which one
it is. [39]
i. If m = 1, Alice chooses r1, d1, w at random and
sends (α,β ), a1 = gr1β d1 , b1 = yr1(α/z)d1 and
a2 = gw, b2 = yw to Bob.
7If m = z, Alice chooses r2, d2, w at random
and sends (α,β ), a1 = gw, b1 = yw, a2 = gr2β d2 ,
b2 = yr2αd2 to Bob.
ii. Bob sends a random c as challenge to Alice.
iii. If m = 1, Alice sends d1, d2 = c−d1 mod q, r1
and r2 = w− rd2 mod q to Bob.
If m = z, Alice sends d1 = c−d2 mod q, d2,
r1 = w− rd1 mod q, and r2 to Bob.
iv. Bob verifies that encrypted value (α,β ) is either 1
or z by checking c= d1+d2 mod q, a1 = gr1β d1 ,
b1 = yr1(α/z)d1 , a2 = gr2β d2 and b2 = yr2αd2 .
ZK4: Alice wants to prove that her encrypted element
(α,β ) = (gcyr,gr) decrypts to gc, where r is
ephemeral key (one-time key) and c ∈ [0,2l − 1],
where l is an arbitrary system parameter.
i. Alice writes down c in binary form, e.g.
c= cl−1 · · ·c1c0 each ct being either 1 or 0 for
t ∈ [0, l−1]. Then, she creates encrypted elements
(α ′l−1,β
′
l−1), (α
′
l−2,β
′
l−2), · · · , (α ′0,β ′0) such that
each element satisfies (g2
tct yr
′
t ,gr
′
t ) = (α ′t ,β ′t ) as
well as ephemeral keys satisfying r = ∑r′t . Then,
she sends new encrypted elements (α ′t ,β ′t ) to Bob.
ii. For each element, Alice proves each (α ′t ,β ′t ) de-
crypts to either 1 or g2
t
with ZK3.
iii. Bob checks if ∏α ′t = α and ∏β ′t = β , along with
ZK3 proofs for each (α ′t ,β ′t ) pair, and confirms
that (α,β ) indeed corresponds to gc where c ∈
[0,2l−1].
B. Active Adversaries
The protocol we described in Section IV so far assumes
that each customer follows the procedure rounds given in
Section III honestly, leaving possible vulnerabilities. There-
fore, the protocol is required to be secured against active
adversaries, for which one possible solution is enforcing the
software with Trusted Computing (TC). However, in order
to eliminate another trusted party, i.e. TC hardware/software
platform, we are proposing an extension to our protocol with
ZKPs.
We consider a full-adversary model. In this security sce-
nario, all operations of the customers, and even the utility, must
be verified. We design our protocol such that any participant
should be able to verify others using the aforementioned
ZKPs with their non-interactive Fiat-Shamir versions [40].
This strong privacy version requires two slight changes from
the above protocol: each customer publicly announces his
decrypting factor in Round 4 and receives others’ as well
as each calculates r and c such that every customer ends
up having the same element via independent computations,
implying the same ephemeral key for the encryption. It also
implies that the contribution of the utility to the DR-bidding
is limited to only determining the available number of units
M, thereby eliminating any possible malicious attempt by the
utility. Below, we describe the rounds as to how the ZKPs in
Section V-A can be used:
R1: Each customer uses ZK1 to prove knowledge of xa
for his published partial public key ya.
R2: Each customer uses ZK4 for every b ja, 1 ≤ j ≤ k,
to prove that his bid vectors satisfy the price vector
interval condition to prevent any kind of price rigging
or collusion.
R3: Any verifier does the same computation and checks
equality of the results.
R4: Each customer uses ZK2 to prove logg ya =
log∏σi j φa j, for 1≤ j ≤ k.
R5-6: Each customer calculates r individually, creates c j
and encrypts with public key y using the same
ephemeral key.
R7: With ZK2, discrete logarithm equality is shown for
each (γ(a)i j ,σ
(a)
i j ), 1≤ i≤ n,1≤ j ≤ k by customer a.
R8: With ZK2, discrete logarithm equality is shown for
each logg ya = log∏σ (a)i j
φ (a)i j , 1 ≤ i ≤ n,1 ≤ j ≤ k by
customer a.
R9: Between the utility and each customer, the outcomes
should be equal and can be verified via the direct
equality check.
Remember that the protocol description in Section III as-
sumes that the utility is an HbC. Obviously, under the full
adversary model, we can no longer trust the utility to carry out
the computations given in Equation (2). Thus, we resort to the
distributed computation of these values by everyone using a
form of MPC. In the former model when the utility is an HbC,
it has the luxury of keeping the winning price secret without
disclosing it to the losers of the bidding process. However, for
the latter, since it is done in a distributed fashion, all parties
will find out the settlement price, including the losers. While
more parties are exposed to this previously secret settlement
price, one might argue that this exposure might be beneficial
from a game-theoretical perspective. However, this dimension
is out of the scope of our paper.
A major computational overhead of the new protocol is the
requirement that every party verify every ZKP created by every
other party. A hybrid solution is possible to relieve this burden:
The utility verifies the ZKPs and broadcasts the results. It is up
to each customer whether to accept these results or to verify
them on his own. We believe that having the possibility to
invoke the full ZKP of each and every step of the bidding
process is by itself a great deterrent to any misuse or abuse to
compromise the integrity. So, in practice, the computational
load of the ZKP for each and every bid can be avoided. A
random invocation of the full ZKP with strict sanctioning of
any misbehavior is likely to be a strong mechanism against
any adversarial participation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Demand response is a central component of the Smart Grid
paradigm as it is the fundamental enabler of a significant
portion of financial and operational benefits to all the parties
involved. Indeed, it is reported by various interest groups that
realization of a demand response ecosystem with full partic-
ipation of market stakeholders has a potential to reduce the
peak electricity demand as much as %20. Hence, increasing
the participation in demand response programs is imperative
for boosting the benefits for both individual consumers and the
8system as a whole. Yet, efficient mechanisms for mitigating
the privacy violation possibilities due to the participation in
demand response programs are not readily available. There-
fore, in this study, we present a distributed. multi-unit privacy
assuring bidding (PAB) protocol for demand response.
The most important feature of our protocol is that it does
not rely on any kind of trusted third party which is essential
in eliminating a potential source for security breaches by
adversaries. We also provide a thorough security analysis of
PAB by means of four Zero-Knowledge Proofs to show that
any potential privacy concerns of the customers are addressed
while the integrity of the process from the utility’s perspective
is preserved. What replaces the trusted third party in our
protocol is the computational hardness of discrete logarithm
problem and efficient zero knowledge proofs.
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